This illustrative deal uses a budget and property profile similar to The Resthouse, paired with AirDNA’s local rental estimate. The score reflects modeled return, operating cushion and rental evidence—not The Resthouse’s actual finances or realized performance.
The score is sensitive to revenue. Sustained booking performance 10% either side of plan moves it from 54 to 97, so read the number with section 04 rather than on its own.
Total 75.9, rounded to 76, under the planning case only. Ten straight years 10% below plan scores 54; ten years 10% above scores 97. Fifty means modeled year-10 proceeds and operations return the opening cash; a loss scores below 50.
The $59,000 setup is a major deal variable, not a standard requirement. A turnkey house might need far less; a rougher one might need more. Compare each property’s purchase price, work required and post-work rental potential together. This forecast assumes a finished, guest-ready home.
Each new year brings another chance to improve pricing, bookings and net income; no growth is assumed here. The plan includes 15% for operations support. A roughly 30% full-service manager would cost about $7,402 more each year at this revenue, if the other fees stayed the same. Full service can also put listing strategy, marketing and guest communication in the manager’s hands. Before signing, check who controls the listing and guest relationship—and whether the added service can earn back its cost.
| Revenue case | Annual revenue | Annual operations | Year-10 gain / opening cash |
|---|---|---|---|
| Conservative · 10% below plan | $44,414 | −$1,580 | +$21,090+16.8% · scores 54 |
| Planning · improved home | $49,348 | +$1,850 | +$55,387+44.2% · scores 76 |
| Optimistic · 10% above plan | $54,283 | +$5,279 | +$89,684+71.6% · scores 97 |
Ten straight years at 10% below plan still produce a modeled $21,090 gain on $125,175 of opening cash. That is a thin nominal return, dependent on the assumed sale value, with annual operating losses to fund. The upside revenue approaches the stronger close rental’s observed result; it is a stretch target, not a promised run rate. The 76 score above applies to the planning case; the same rubric returns 54 and 97 at the other two.
Treat $157,623 as a first-year funding limit for the plan: if STR bookings fail, decide whether to switch strategy or sell before committing more. Mid-term (MTR) and long-term (LTR) renting are possible retreat paths, but first test achievable rents against roughly $2,458/month of modeled fixed carry, plus any different leasing costs and rules. Neither fallback is included in the returns above. The flat-price sale assumes 0% home appreciation, planned STR revenue, 60% improvement recovery and 7% selling costs; continuing rent and loan paydown turn that case positive in year 11. This decision limit cannot guarantee total spending: debt, repairs or a delayed sale can require more.
Why consider the hot tub? AirROI’s four-market comparison found hot-tub listings earning 34%–121% more annual revenue than listings without one. That is an observed association across different homes and markets, not a forecast of this tub’s return or a 20% uplift added to these numbers. This model lacks a reliable unrenovated revenue estimate. A turnkey home could be the better buy if its purchase premium replaces setup cost and risk.
These are rental comps, not competing houses to buy. A second property could score higher or lower at a different price, renovation cost, financing rate or legal status. Compare both with the same underwriting and score rules.
As a hypothetical yardstick only, opening cash growing at a constant 4% for ten years becomes $185,290. The modeled property sale equity plus operating cash saved at that same assumed rate becomes $184,273. Neither rate nor home appreciation is assured. The STR thesis also involves use of the home, operational control, illiquidity and concentrated property risk.
At 76 on the planning case, this property modeled on The Resthouse offers a reasonable path to meaningful upside over a 10+ year hold. The case works if the improved home approaches the selected rental comps and you can fund a slow start. A first-year cash plan, other rental uses and the option to sell give you decisions to make if bookings disappoint; none guarantees a limited loss.
Illustrative model. The purchase, financing and improvement budget illustrate a property like The Resthouse; none of the figures represent The Resthouse’s exact acquisition costs, booked revenue, net operating results, tax benefits or realized sale proceeds. AirDNA shows $49.4K rounded; $280.50 ADR × 365 × 48.2% occupancy yields $49,348.37, used in the calculations. AirDNA modeled four guests; the illustrative property sleeps five, as does The Resthouse. A fifth guest may affect rate, occupancy, both or neither, so the $49,348 revenue input is left unchanged until matched five-guest evidence supports a different figure; the difference widens the plausible range rather than shifting the estimate. AirDNA’s displayed expense, NOI and cap-rate figures do not reconcile with updated revenue, so the deal budget supplies operating costs.
Deal thesis score. The three component scores are weighted 75% / 15% / 10%. Capital result: for a positive ten-year gain, 50 + 50 × (gain ÷ opening cash) ÷ 72.6724%, capped at 100. For a loss, 50 × (1 + gain ÷ opening cash), floored at zero. The capital component’s 100 anchor is a similar improved home bought in cash at the stronger relevant rental peer’s $54,600 annual revenue: $258,114 gain on $355,175 opening cash. Operating cushion: 100 × (planned revenue − operating breakeven) ÷ (10% of planned revenue), limited to 0–100. The 10% denominator is a chosen stress threshold, not a calibrated scale — it awards full credit to a house that can miss plan by 10% and still cover operations. The observable figure behind it is this property’s 5.4% break-even buffer, which is the number to weigh. Thresholds should be set from comparable properties’ revenue variability, which has not been measured here. Evidence: 40 of 40 for AirDNA’s high-confidence estimate and 20 of 40 for two close rental peers in a small comp set, rescaled to 75 of 100. No deduction is taken for the four-guest estimate applied to a five-guest house: sleeping capacity alone does not establish a revenue difference, and an invented point penalty would imply a precision the evidence does not support. That mismatch is stated as a limitation that widens the plausible revenue range instead. The final score is the weighted sum; a ten-year loss is capped below 50, exact capital recovery scores 50, and a gain scores above 50. A perfect overall score requires top marks on all three components. The model assumes 2% annual home growth and 60% improvement recovery; these are sensitivities, not forecasts.
Renovation comparison. With 60% recovery of the improvement budget and 7% selling costs, the unrecovered setup cost is $26,078. Dividing by ten years and 69.5% of booked revenue left after the workbook’s management and platform fees gives ~$3,752 extra annual revenue needed to cover that cost. This ignores different maintenance, tax treatment and financing or opportunity costs. It cannot establish the unrenovated home’s demand.
Other limits. Percentages beside sale gains are cumulative gain divided by the $125,175 opening cash; they are not annual returns. Year-15 results assume flat nominal revenue and expenses. The first-year zero-booking cash plan is not a worst-case loss or a hard spending cap. MTR and LTR alternatives need separate rent, expense, insurance and lease checks. The model includes 15% operations management and 15.5% platform fees on gross revenue. The 30% full-service fee comparison assumes identical booked revenue and unchanged other fees; actual service scope, platform charges, listing rights and guest access depend on the agreement. Depreciation and qualifying material participation might improve annual after-tax results; capital-gains tax and depreciation recapture could reduce exit proceeds. Confirm permits, appraisal-supported resale values, guest capacity and operating costs.
Beyond a thesis, deeper work continues at agreed rates, flat or hourly, scoped in writing before anything starts. Multi-property comparisons, full acquisition analysis and launch planning all build on the same model.
A property like The Resthouse · illustrative figures · September 2026